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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Anthony Wayne Conner appeals from

his petition for post—conviction relief.

that

Conner

Statement

Conner argues

Of The

Facts

that the district court erred

when

found

it

And Course Of The Proceedings

Conner (“Otis”) dead

in the garage

After

I_d.

some

in

to report

of the

503, 387 P.3d 170, 171 (Ct. App. 2016).

ladder.

judgment summarily dismissing

failed t0 sufﬁciently allege Stricklandl prejudice.

Anthony Wayne Conner called 91 1
Otis

the district court’s

having found his

home they shared.

Conner reported

“on a rug

State V. Conner, 161 Idaho 502,

he found Otis’s body next to a

Conner’s family expressed doubts that Otis died from an accident, the

police executed a search warrant for Conner’s home.

Otis’s blood

that

father,

in the laundry

Li.

Among

other things, detectives found

room, on the east living room wall, in the carpeting under the

heat register, in a carpet cleaning machine, 0n the underside 0f a chair in the living room, 0n the
living

room

hammer.”

on the garage ﬂoor, 0n one of the

ceiling,

The

Li.

state

legs 0f the ladder,

and on the claw of a

charged Conner With ﬁrst degree murder, grand

theft, forgery,

and

destruction, alteration, or concealment of evidence. Li.

Before

trial,

the district court entered an order prohibiting any witness

from sharing

his or

her testimony with any other witness. (R., p.218.) The order did not have an exception for expert
Witnesses. (R., p.218.)

At

hammer

1

trial,

the state presented the jury

in the living

its

room, dragged his body

theory that “Conner hit Otis on the head with a
t0 the garage,

Strickland V. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

and staged an accident using the

ladder.” Conner, 161 Idaho at 503,

case:

Tom

387 P.3d

at 171.

The

state enlisted three experts to

support

its

Bevel, a forensic scientist specializing in bloodstain pattern analysis, opined that the

evidence showed Otis had not died in an accident but had been killed. (TL,

Ada County

p.

1230, L.23

— p.1323,

Coroner’s Ofﬁce, testiﬁed that

L.5.2) Dr.

Glen Groben, a forensic pathologist

he

concluded that Otis died from an accident but, upon receiving additional information,

initially

formed the opinion
Dr. William

Dr.

Smock, a medical doctor, opined

Groben

ear

was

that Otis’s injuries

testiﬁed,

among

left ear.

other things, that

(Tr., p.

things, the

Smock

— p.1496,

amount of force

it

p.1578, L.11

— p.1579,

would take

L.1

1.)

left

L.4.)

L.12.)

Otis’s body,

he found

also testiﬁed that the blood in Otis’s

ear but

— p. 1450,

had not mentioned the

L. 1 .)

basilar skull

L.14.)

testiﬁed after Dr. Groben.

Groben’s testimony that blood in the
(T12,

— p.1590,

consistent With a fracture along the base 0fthe skull. (T12, p. 1449, L.13

(TL, p.1495, L.22

Dr.

He

— p.1465,

were consistent with homicide

When he examined

1450, Ls.2-5.)

Dr. Groben’s report mentioned the blood in Otis’s

fracture.

(TL, p.1433, L.14

falling off of a ladder. (TL, p.1549, L.3

blood coming out of Otis’s
left

0f death was homicide.

that Otis’s cause

and inconsistent With

in the

left

As

(TL, p.1549, Ls.3-7.)

He

t0 cause Otis’s injuries and, in

addressed,

doing

so,

among

other

referenced Dr.

ear indicated a skull fracture at the bottom of the skull.

relevant to this appeal, Dr.

Smock

also testiﬁed that (1)

Otis had a “superﬁcial abraded area” in addition to the three obvious lacerations 0n his head, (2)
the perpendicular nature 0f two of the lacerations

a ladder, (3) Otis had a laceration 0n his

amount 0f blood found

2

in the

home was

left

on

his

head was inconsistent with

falling off

hand consistent With a defensive wound,

inconsistent With Conner’s story that Otis

A11 citations t0 the transcript refer to the consecutively paginated

trial transcript in

of

(4) the

had previously

the underlying

criminal proceeding, which transcript the district court reviewed before dismissing Conner’s
petition.

(R.,

p.229

& n.10.)

home and tried to

fallen in the

clean up his

had been moved indicated a staged scene.

— p.1584,

p.1582, L.20

examination, Dr.

(T12,

L.22, p.1585, L.17

Smock

p.1592, L.14

own blood, and
(T12,

(5) the

evidence showing Otis’s body

p.1579, Ls.13-21, p.1581, L.16

— p.1586, L.13, p.1587, L.15 — p.1589,

said that he learned about Dr. Groben’s testimony

— p.1593, L8, p.1607,

Ls.5-23.)

Dr.

Smock ﬁnished

— p.1582,

L.1

1.)

L.9,

On cross-

from the prosecutor.

testifying

0n a Friday.

(TL, p.1548, L.2, p.1614, Ls.1 1-18.)

The following Monday, Conner’s counsel informed the

district court that

they were “in the

process 0f formulating a motion to strike the testimony of Dr. [Smock].” (Tr., p.1762, Ls.1-10.)
Speciﬁcally, they argued that the state had violated the district court’s order 0n the exclusion of

witnesses

They

by

telling Dr.

Smock about

Dr. Groben’s testimony. (Tr., p.1762, L.11

Smock had offered opinions

also argued that Dr.

in his testimony that

— p.1764,

L.4.)

went beyond the scope

of his report in Violation 0f the expert disclosure requirements. (TL, p.1762, L.11 — p.1764, L.4.)

Conner subsequently ﬁled a motion

The

district court

to strike Dr.

Smock’s testimony. (TL, p.2203, Ls.1 1-19.)

denied Conner’s motion.

(T12,

p.223 1, L.19 — p.2234, L.16.) The

court found that Conner’s counsel had ﬁled the motion too

court also noted, with respect to the state informing Dr.

it

was “not convinced 0n

this

late.

district

(TL, p.2232, Ls.6-23.) The district

Smock about Dr. Groben’s testimony,

that

record that anything that happened in that conversation, whatever

it

was, inﬂuenced [Dr. Smock’s] testimony because he did clearly state that his opinions were his

and based on his review of the forensic evidence.”

(Tr.,

p.2234, Ls.1 1-16.)

The jury convicted Conner of second-degree murder and destruction of evidence.
p.212.)

The

district court

(R.,

sentenced Conner to thirty years in prison, With eighteen years ﬁxed, for

second-degree murder and t0 a concurrent ﬁve years for the destruction of evidence. (R., p.65.)

Conner timely appealed from the judgment, and the Idaho Court of Appeals afﬁrmed Conner’s

ﬂ m,

convictions.

161 Idaho at 507, 387 P.3d at 175.

Conner timely ﬁled a

petition for post-conviction relief.

(R., pp.6-10.)

The

district court

As relevant

appointed counsel, and Conner amended his petition twice. (R., pp.29, 35-44, 64-78.)
t0 this appeal,

Conner alleged

their obj ections to Dr.

that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance

Smock’s testimony

that the state

had violated the

by delaying

district court’s

exclusion

order and that Dr. Smock’s testimony exceeded the scope of his report.

(R., pp.67-74.)

alleged that, had his

court would have struck

trial

counsel raised these obj ections

Dr. Smock’s testimony in

its

earlier, the district

Conner

Smock’s testimony, the jury would have

entirety and, without Dr.

acquitted Conner. (R., pp.67-74.)

The
conviction

state

relief.

moved

the district court to summarily dismiss Conner’s petition for post-

(R., pp.94-126.)

With respect

t0 Conner’s claim about Dr.

Smock, the

state

argued that Conner had failed to sufﬁciently allege either deﬁcient performance or prejudice as
required under Strickland. (R., pp.99-120.)

The

district court

district court

0f the

late

ﬁled the motion, the
it

wounds 0n

(R., p.220.)

district court

The

district court

found

would have granted it in part.

would have struck Dr. Smock’s testimony about

violated the order

would have

summary

dismissal. (R., pp.212-32.)

The

recognized that “Conner’s right t0 post-conviction relief depends in part 0n the merits

ﬁled motion.”

found that

granted the state’s motion for

on the exclusion of witnesses.

struck Dr.

Otis’s

(R., p.223.)

that,

had Conner’s counsel timely

(R., pp.220-29.)

The

district court

the skull fracture because the state

The

district court also

found that

it

Smock’s testimony about the superﬁcial abraded area and the defensive

ﬁnger because those portions of Dr. Smock’s testimony exceeded the scope 0f

his report. (R., pp.224-26.)

The

district court

found that

it

would have denied the

rest

of Conner’s

motion.

(R., pp.225-27.)

Based on

its

ﬁndings of what

it

would have done had Conner ﬁled a

timely motion t0 strike Dr. Smock’s testimony, the district court found that Conner had failed t0
sufﬁciently allege Strickland prejudice because, even Without those portions of Dr. Smock’s

testimony, the result of the

trial

summarily dismissed Conner’s

would have been

petition.

Conner timely appealed.

(R.,

the same.

pp.232, 242.)

(R., pp.244-47.)

(R., p.229.)

The

district court

ISSUE
Conner

states the issue

on appeal

as:

Whether the court erred in summarily dismissing the petition for post—conviction relief
based 0n ineffective assistance 0f counsel.
(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Conner

failed t0

show

petition for post-conviction relief?

that the district court erred

When

it

summarily dismissed

his

ARGUMENT
The
A.

District

Court Did Not Err

BV Dismissing Conner’s

Petition For Post—Conviction Relief

Introduction

The

properly dismissed Conner’s petition for post-conviction

district court

relief.

A

petition for post-conviction relief is subject t0 dismissal if the petitioner fails t0 allege facts that

justify relief as a matter

of law. For claims of ineffective assistance 0f counsel, the petitioner must

allege sufﬁcient facts to satisfy both prongs of Strickland: deﬁcient performance

Here, Conner alleged that his counsel provided ineffective assistance
six different parts

of Dr. Smock’s testimony. The

three 0fthose obj ections,

0n appeal.

Instead,

district court

by failing t0 timely object t0

found that

it

and Conner has not challenged that portion 0fthe

Conner focuses 0n the three objections

have sustained—namely, obj ections
fracture, (2), the superﬁcial

to Dr.

and prejudice.

would have overruled

district court’s

that the district court

Smock’s testimony about

found

decision

it

would

(1) Otis’s basilar skull

abraded area on Otis’s head, and (3) the defensive

wound on

Otis’s

ﬁnger. The district court properly dismissed the ineffective assistance claims based 0n these three
objections because

B.

Standard

Conner

failed t0 allege prejudice sufﬁcient to satisfy Strickland.

Of Review

“On review of a

dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary

hearing, this Court Will determine Whether a genuine issue of fact exists based

0n the pleadings,

depositions and admissions together With any afﬁdavits 0n ﬁle and will liberally construe the facts

and reasonable inferences

in favor

903, 174 P.3d 870, 873 (2007).

0f the non-moving party.” Charboneau

V. State,

144 Idaho 900,

The

C.

District

Court Properly Dismissed Conner’s Petition Because His Allegations Did Not

Justify Relief Under Strickland

The

district court

properly dismissed Conner’s petition for post—conviction

“applicant for post-conviction relief must prove

upon Which the
174 P.3d

at

application

is

application for post-conviction relief

based.” LC. § 19-4903 (emphasis added). “The application must include afﬁdavits,

“Summary

its

allegations, 0r

must
at

state

Why

such supporting evidence

873.

disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief

applicant’s evidence raises

is

grounds upon which the

set forth the

not included.” Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903, 174 P.3d

court

the allegations

based.” Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903,

is

The application must “speciﬁcally

873.

records, 0r other evidence supporting

is

by a preponderance 0f evidence

An

relief.

no genuine issue 0f material

fact.”

I_d.;

ﬂ

LC.

is

§

appropriate if the

19-4906(b),

(c).

“A

required t0 accept the petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, but need not accept the

petitioner’s conclusions.”

Charboneau, 144 Idaho

at

903, 174 P.3d at 873.

The

district court

may

dismiss an application for post-conViction relief Without holding an evidentiary hearing Where the
allegations “are clearly disproved

by the record 0f the

original proceeding” or

“d0 not justify relief

as a matter of law.” Li.

The two-prong

test set forth in Strickland V.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), governs

post-conviction claims for ineffective assistance 0f counsel. Dunlap V. State, 159 Idaho 280, 296,

360 P.3d 289, 305 (2015). “To prevail on such a claim, the applicant for post-conviction

must demonstrate
and

(1) counsel’s

performance

fell

below an objective standard 0f reasonableness,

(2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result

different.” State V.

a motion for

Page, 146 Idaho

summary

relief

would have been

548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008). “‘[I]n order to survive

dismissal, post-conviction relief claims based

0f counsel must establish the existence of material issues of

upon

fact as to’

ineffective assistance

both Strickland prongs.”

Du_nlap, 159 Idaho at 296,

1,

39 (2013)).

360 P.3d

at

305 (quoting State

V.

Where, as here, “the alleged deﬁciency

Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 383, 313 P.3d

is

counsel’s failure t0 ﬁle a motion, a

conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by the

Sanchez

determinative of both prongs 0f the test.”

646

(Ct.

V. State,

trial court, is

generally

127 Idaho 709, 713, 905 P.2d 642,

App. 1995).

“When

evaluating an ineffective assistance 0f counsel claim, this Court does not second-

guess strategic and tactical decisions, and such decisions cannot serve as a basis for post—conviction
relief unless the decision is

shown

t0

have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the

relevant law 0r other shortcomings capable 0f objective review.”

P.3d

“‘There

at 136.

is

m,

a strong presumption that counsel’s performance

0f professional assistance.”

Li. (quoting State V. Hairston,

146 Idaho

fell

at

561, 199

within the wide range

133 Idaho 496, 51

1,

988 P.2d 1170,

1185 (1999)).
Here, the district court properly dismissed Conner’s claims related to Dr. Smock’s
testimony.

Conner alleged

that his counsel should

Smock’s testimony, including testimony related

Dr.

have timely challenged

amount ofblood found at the crime

24.)

The

district court

testimony,

it

found

that,

would have denied

scene, and the

even

if

body. (R., pp.224-27.) The

Conner had ﬁled a timely motion

at the

district court’s

it

(R.,

to strike Dr.

hand,

pp.220-

Smock’s

related to the perpendicular nature of the

crime scene, and the movement of the Victim’s

ﬁnding

San_chez, 127 Idaho at 713, 905 P.2d at 646,

(ﬂ Appellant’s brief, pp.6-30).

wound 0n Otis’s

movement of the Victim’s body.

the motion insofar as

two wounds, the amount of blood found

of

to Otis’s basilar skull fracture, the superﬁcial

abraded area, the perpendicular nature of two 0f the wounds, the defensive
the

six different parts

is

“determinative 0f both [Strickland] prongs,”

and Conner has not challenged the ﬁnding on appeal

That leaves Conner with the three parts 0f Dr. Smock’s testimony that the

found it would have struck had a timely motion been brought:

(1)

testimony related t0 Otis

skull fracture, (2) testimony related t0 the superﬁcial abraded area,

defensive

wound 0n Otis’s

The

The

it

related t0 these aspects 0f Dr.

District Court Properly

Related

T0

district court

and

(3)

’

s

basilar

testimony related to the

hand. (R., pp.224-27.) The district court properly dismissed Conner’s

ineffective assistance claim as

1.

district court

Smock’s testimony.

Dismissed Conner’s Ineffective Assistance Claim

Dr. Smock’s Testimony

About

Otis’s Basilar Skull Fracture

properly dismissed Conner’s claim that his counsel should have timely

objected to Dr. Smock’s testimony about Otis’s basilar skull fracture because Conner failed to
sufﬁciently allege deﬁcient performance or prejudice.

As t0 deﬁcient performance, Conner failed

overcome the “strong presumption

t0 allege facts sufﬁcient t0

that counsel’s

within the wide range 0f professional assistance.” P_axﬂ, 146 Idaho

at

performance

fell

561, 199 P.3d at 136.

It

has long been the rule in Idaho that this Court Will “not second-guess strategic and tactical
decisions,”

Which means a post-conviction

allegedly deﬁcient performance either

petitioner

was not

must

tactical

allege facts sufﬁcient to

or

was

show

that the

tactical but “resulted

from

inadequate preparation, ignorance 0f the relevant law or other shortcomings capable 0f objective
review.”

I_d.

First,

Conner has done

neither.

Conner did not

allege

facts

sufﬁcient

to

show

the

decision

t0

forego

a

contemporaneous objection to Dr. Smock’s testimony about the basilar skull fracture was not
tactical.

“[C]ounsel’s

decisions.”

summary

Grove

.

.

.

lack 0f objections t0 testimony are considered tactical 0r strategic

V. State,

161 Idaho 840, 855, 392 P.3d 18, 33 (Ct. App. 2017) (afﬁrming

dismissal of claim that

to certain testimony).

trial

counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing t0 object

In fact, the record here

shows

that

Conner’s

trial

counsel

made

a strategic

decision t0 forego an obj ection and instead use the prosecutor’s relay of information to Dr.

10

Smock

to attack Dr.

Smock’s testimony and,

prosecutor’s credibility.

at least implicitly, the

examination, Conner’s counsel asked Dr.

Smock

On

cross-

the following questions:

Q. NOW, you mentioned Dr. Groben’s testimony. Were you here yesterday?
A. No, sir.
Q. How did you hear about that?
A. From talking with the prosecutor yesterday afternoon.
Q.

When you were

that there

A. Yes,

was a

told about Dr. Groben,

you were

told that Dr.

Groben testiﬁed

skull fracture?

sir.

Q. And that wasn’t in your report;
A. That is correct.

is

that correct?

Q. Okay. So you’re relying on the information 0f others in your testimony here

today very clearly, right?
A. Certainly photographs, descriptions.
Q. Okay. So your testimony or your opinion today
independent assessment?

A. N0,
well as

is

not exclusively based on your

my opinions are based 0n my assessment 0f the information
my education, experience, and training over the last 30 years.

provided as

(TL, p.1592, Ls.14-19, p.1607, Ls.6-23.) Conner’s counsel would not have been able to pursue
this line

0f attack 0n Dr. Smock’s testimony and,

he had stopped Dr.

Smock from

at least implicitly, the prosecutor’s credibility if

testifying about the basilar skull fracture during his direct

examination. The decision to pursue this attack rather than defensively obj ect was

The

district court rejected the state’s

argument

decision t0 delay the obj ection 0n the basis that Conner’s
in the post-conviction proceedings.

backwards when
tactical,

presume

gg”

it

had

t0

it

reasoned

assume

that, in the

trial

(R., p.228.)

that

trial

The

tactical.

Conner’s counsel made a

tactical

counsel “ha[d] yet t0 be heard from”

district court

had Strickland exactly

absence of trial counsel’s testimony that the decision was

counsel acted negligently. Strickland required the district court t0

that tactical reasons, rather than sheer neglect,

State V. Hall, 163 Idaho 744, 820,

animated defense counsel’s actions.

419 P.3d 1042, 1118 (2018) (“‘[T]here

presumption that [counsel took certain actions] for

11

tactical reasons rather

is

m,

a strong

than through sheer

neglect.”’ (brackets in original) (quoting

Yarborough

V.

Gentry, 540 U.S.

Strickland presumption and the record in this case, the district court erred

allegations sufﬁcient to sustain a

prima facie claim

that counsel did not

engage in cross—examination and thus delay the objection

to Dr.

1,

Given the

8 (2003)).

When it found Conner’s

make

a tactical decision t0

Smock’s testimony about the

basilar skull fracture.

Second, Conner did not even attempt t0 allege that his

trial

counsel’s decision to not

make

a contemporaneous objection “resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance 0f the relevant law
0r other shortcoming capable of objective review,”

m,

146 Idaho

at

561, 199 P.3d at 136, and

With good reason. The relevant law was Idaho Rule 0f Evidence 615, and Conner alleged in his
petition that his trial counsel fully understood

Rule 615

at the

p.67.) In short, Conner’s counsel delayed the obj ection until

and

eat

it

too: if the district court struck that portion

would have enjoyed

the beneﬁt 0f attacking Dr.

time 0f a pre-trial hearing.

Monday in an

make

Smock’s and the prosecutor’s

if the

counsel

made

and

a tactical

show

that

the law or a lack of preparation, the district court

should have dismissed this claim 0n the basis that Conner’s

Even

trial

credibility

a contemporaneous objection and Conner has not even tried to

was based 0n ignorance 0f

tactical decision

have his cake

0f Dr. Smock’s testimony 0n Monday, Conner

excluding that portion of Dr. Smock’s testimony. Because Conner’s
decision t0 not

effort to

(E R.,

trial

counsel

made

a tactical decision.

decision to delay objecting t0 Dr. Smock’s testimony about the basilar skull

fracture

were not

Conner

failed t0 sufﬁciently allege prejudice.

tactical,

however, the

district court still

properly dismissed this claim because

E m,

146 Idaho

at

561, 199 P.3d at 136

(observing that Strickland prejudice requires “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
errors, the result

would have been

basilar skull fracture

was

different”).

For

starters,

Dr.

Smock’s testimony

duplicative of Dr. Groben’s testimony.

12

that Otis

had a

E, gg, State V. Johnson,

163

Idaho 412, 426-27, 414 P.3d 234, 248-49 (2017) (holding erroneous admission of testimony
harmless because the same evidence was properly admitted later in the

trial);

State V. Sandoval-

Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 912, 71 P.3d 1055, 1059 (2003) (holding erroneous admission 0f report

harmless because “[t]he report was a duplicate 0f testimony under oath”); Leliefeld

V.

Johnson,

104 Idaho 357, 369-70, 659 P.2d 111, 123-24 (1983) (holding erroneous admission of evidence
harmless because

it

“was largely duplicative 0f admissible and admitted evidence”). Dr. Groben

testiﬁed at length about Otis’s basilar skull fracture, including

basilar skull fracture

and

that

p.1450, L.5, p.1491, L.14

p.151

1,

Ls.4-13.)

Dr.

it

was caused by blunt

— p.1492,

Smock

how he

could

tell that

Otis had a

force trauma t0 the head. (Tr., p.1449, L.4

L.9, p.1497, L.8

— p.1499,

testiﬁed consistent with Dr.

L.3, p.1506, L.14

Groben

that the injury

— p.1508,

on Dr. Groben’s testimony

as to the basilar skull fracture.

(TL, p.1578, L.11

L.11 (“I believe [Dr. Groben] testiﬁed because of the blood in the right

was

consistent With a basilar skull fracture.”).)

—

in

L.3,

on the back of

the top of Otis’s head caused the basilar skull fracture and expressly informed the jury that he

relying

—

one of the

was

— p.1579,
ears, that

Thus, the jury could not believe Dr. Smock’s

testimony about the basilar skull fracture Without ﬁrst believing Dr. Groben’s nearly identical
testimony about the basilar skull fracture. Thus, the admission of Dr. Smock’s testimony could
not have affected the verdict.

13

Moreover, as the
fracture

district court

recognized, Dr. Smock’s testimony about the basilar skull

was a relatively insigniﬁcant part of his testimony supporting the

The more important and lengthy part of Dr. Smock’s testimony was
head were
(T12,

all

consistent with an attack from a

p.1572, L.6

— p.1578,

the basilar skull fracture

part of Dr.

was nearly identical

Smock’s testimony

Conner argues

to Dr.

L.19.) Because Dr.

Smock’s testimony about

Groben’s testimony and made up only a small

that supported the state, there is not a reasonable probability that,

had Conner’s counsel successfully objected
basilar skull fracture, the result

0n Otis’s

that the lacerations

hammer and inconsistent with falling off of a ladder.

— p.1582,

L.3, p. 1 580, L.5

state’s case.3 (R., p.229.)

of the

trial

to the admission

would have been

of Dr. Smock’s testimony about the

different.

that the district court’s prejudice analysis should

have considered the

prejudice of Dr. Smock’s entire testimony because, in Conner’s View, the proper

remedy

for the

prosecutor Violating the district court’s exclusion order would have been to exclude Dr. Smock’s

testimony in

its

entirety.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.24-30.)

But, as the district court recognized,

“[W]hether a Violation of an exclusion order results in disallowing the Witness t0 testify
discretionary call

by

P.2d 10, 14 (1998).)
[can] demonstrate

the trial judge.” (R., p.222 (citing State V. Cardell, 132 Idaho 217, 221,

And

is

a

970

an appellate court will not question that decision unless “the appellant

how the testimony may have been tainted by the witness’s

exposure

.

.

.

t0 other

testimony.” Cardell, 132 Idaho at 221, 970 P.2d at 14.

3

The physical evidence presented

at trial

diminished even further the importance 0f Dr. Smock’s

testimony about the basilar skull fracture.
laundry room, 0n the east living

room

The

detectives found Otis’s blood “on a rug in the

wall, in the carpeting under the heat register, in a carpet

cleaning machine, on the underside 0f a chair in the living room, on the living

room

ceiling,

on the

garage ﬂoor, 0n one 0f the legs of the ladder, and on the claw of a hammer.” Conner, 161 Idaho

Bevel testiﬁed that the blood on the living room ceiling indicated Otis
had been struck multiple times in the living room with an obj ect “extending from a person’s hand
with sufﬁcient velocity that, with the castoff, it reaches the ceiling as opposed t0 just doing a
at

503, 387 P.3d at 171.

parabolic arc and landing 0n the ﬂoor.” (TL, p.13 13, Ls.6-17.)

14

Here, the district court found that

because

it

it

would not have excluded Dr. Smock’s

entire testimony

found Dr. Smock did not change his testimony based 0n the information he learned from

the prosecutor about Dr. Groben’s testimony.

as t0 the testimony that

(R., pp.222-23.)

would have been excluded

at trial

purposes of Strickland prejudice. Sanchez, 127 Idaho

Conner takes issue With the

district court’s

at

That decision

is

“determinative”

had Conner’s counsel objected

for

713, 905 P.2d at 646.

decision t0 exclude only part 0f Dr. Smock’s

testimony and argues that he was prejudiced by the Violation of the exclusion order because

allowed Dr.

Smock t0 conform all of his testimony t0

pp.24-30.) But, as the district court observed, if Dr.
to Dr.

Groben’s testimony, he did a

terrible

it

Dr. Groben’s testimony. (Appellant’s brief,

Smock was

trying to

conform

his testimony

job because “some 0f Dr. Smock’s testimony

contradicted Dr. Groben’s testimony,” including Dr. Groben’s testimony “that one 0f the injuries

was

not, in his opinion, the result

(R., p.223.)

In short,

testimony the
to

conform

Conner has

district court said

to Dr.

it

of a blow from the claw 0f a hammer, but from a ﬂat surface.”
failed to point to

would have excluded—that Dr. Smock changed from

Groben’s testimony. Thus, the

persuasive value of Dr. Smock’s testimony in

2.

The

any of Dr. Smock’s testimony—other than the

its

district court

his report

properly refused to consider the

entirety to analyze prejudice

under Strickland.

Dismissed Conner’s Ineffective Assistance Claim
Related To Dr. Smock’s Testimony About The Superﬁcial Abraded Area

The

District Court Properly

district court

properly dismissed Conner’s claim that his counsel should have timely

objected t0 Dr. Smock’s testimony about the superﬁcial abraded area 0n Otis’s head because

Conner

failed t0 sufﬁciently allege prejudice.

E m,

146 Idaho

at

561, 199 P.3d at 136

(observing that Strickland prejudice requires “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
errors, the result

would have been

different”).

The superﬁcial abraded area was a

top 0f Otis’s head, with the other three injuries being the

15

fourth injury

on

more obvious and more severe lacerations.

With respect

t0 the superﬁcial

picture of Otis’s

He

L.4.)

a ladder.

head and

that

Smock

abraded area, Dr.

it

was caused by blunt

testiﬁed only that he could see

force trauma.

came from

did not opine 0n Whether the superﬁcial abraded area

(E

Tr.,

p.1579, L.13

— p.1580,

blunt force trauma from the claw of a

L.4.) In fact, Dr.

(TL, p.1579, L.13
a

it

in the

— p.1580,

hammer or a fall from

Smock’s testimony that Otis died from

hammer was based 0n

the three

more obvious and more

severe lacerations. (TL, p. 1 580, Ls.8-24 (testifying that Otis died from “at least three blows” from

a claw

hammer) (emphasis added);

were inconsistent With
tells

me

there

is

falling

Tr., p.

1

580, L.25

— p. 1 58 1

,

L. 1 5 (explaining that Otis’s injuries

from a ladder because “When you see three separate

three separate blows”) (emphases added).)

Dr.

Smock

superﬁcial abraded area to reach his key conclusion that Otis died from a

from accidentally

falling off a ladder,

lacerations, that

did not rely on the

hammer

attack and not

and thus Dr. Smock merely pointing out the superﬁcial

abraded area’s existence could not have contributed to the verdict.4

Conner argues
t0 object to Dr.

24.)

He

is

that the district court did not address the prejudice

Smock’s testimony about the superﬁcial abraded

area.

from his counsel’s

(Appellant’s brief, pp.23-

correct that, in the section of the district court’s order addressing prejudice, the district

court listed only the basilar skull fracture testimony and the defensive

excludable. (R., pp.228-29.)

list

The

0f excludable testimony as a

include the testimony in

With that reading, the

its

reasoning as to

its

state reads the

an indication that the

prejudice analysis. (R., pp.228-29.)

Why Conner

This

is

as

omission 0f the superﬁcial abraded area from the

clerical error, not as

district court’s

wound testimony

To

district court forgot to

the extent this Court disagrees

omission 0f the superﬁcial abraded area

is

harmless because

failed t0 allege prejudice With respect to the other excludable

testimony applies with even greater force t0 the superﬁcial abraded area.

4

failure

especially true given the physical evidence in the case.

16

ﬂ

supra note

(R.,

3.

p.229 (“The

testimony 0f Dr.

Smock may have been

a bridge [between the state’s other two experts], but the

excluded testimony is not the deck or girders 0fthe bridge.”).) The

have concluded that the superﬁcial abraded area was more
state’s

district court

critical to Dr.

Smock’s opinions or the

case than the basilar skull fracture 0r defensive wound, which both featured

prominently in Dr. Smock’s testimony and were actually connected t0 the
that

could not possibly

Conner

(Compare

killed Otis

Tr.,

L20 — p. 1 584,

and Otis did not die by accidentally

p.1579, L.13

— p.1580,

L.4,

ﬂ

Tr.,

falling off

p.1578, L.11

state’s

more

theory 0f the case

0f a ladder in the garage.

— p.1579, L.11

w

Tr.,

p.1582,

L22.)

Moreover, Conner failed t0 allege in his petition or explain in his opening brief how Dr.

Smock’s testimony about the superﬁcial abraded area prejudiced him.
brief, pp.23-30.)

Instead,

because Conner believes

(R.,

pp.73-74; Appellant’s

Conner focused 0n the prejudice from Dr. Smock’s testimony

all

0f Dr. Smock’s testimony would have been stricken

if his

in toto

counsel had

timely objected to the prosecutor’s Violation of the witness exclusion order.5 (Appellant’s brief,
pp.23-30.) Dr. Smock’s testimony about the superﬁcial abraded area, however, had nothing to d0

With the exclusion order. Conner challenged the superﬁcial abraded area only 0n the basis that

exceeded the scope 0f Dr. Smock’s report

(R., p.224),

and Conner has not even alleged

proper remedy for an expert testifying beyond the scope of his report
testimony,

c_f.

district court’s

his report).

object t0 Dr.

when

5

it

Jones

V.

Flowserve

FCD Com,

that the

of the expert’s

73 F. App’x 706, 709 (5th Cir. 2003) (afﬁrming

exclusion of only those portions of expert testimony that went outside the scope 0f

Because Conner

failed t0 allege

how he was

prejudiced

Smock’s testimony about the superﬁcial abraded

dismissed Conner’s claim on that basis.

As explained

is t0 strike all

it

above, that

is

incorrect.

E

(R.,

supra Part C. 1.

17

by

his counsel’s failure t0

area, the district court did not err

p.212 (“Petitioner Conner has not

demonstrated that he was prejudiced by

Conner

failed to argue in his

trial

counsel’s deﬁcient performance.”).)

And

because

opening brief that his counsel’s failure to object to Dr. Smock’s

testimony about the superﬁcial abraded area prejudiced him, he has waived that argument 0n
appeal.

E

Bolognese

V. Forte,

153 Idaho 857, 866, 292 P.3d 248, 257 (2012)

consider assignments of error not supported

The

3.

District Court Properly

Related

The

T0

district court

by argument and

(“We

will not

authority in the opening brief”).

Dismissed Conner’s Ineffective Assistance Claim
About The Defensive Wound On Otis’s Hand

Dr. Smock’s Testimony

properly dismissed Conner’s claim that his counsel should have timely

objected to Dr. Smock’s testimony about the defensive
failed t0 sufﬁciently allege prejudice.

ﬂ m,

wound on

146 Idaho

at

Otis’s

ﬁnger because Conner

561, 199 P.3d at 136 (observing

that Strickland prejudice requires “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result

would have been
opening brief

T0

different”).

how

begin,

Conner

failed to allege in his petition or explain in his

Dr. Smock’s testimony related t0 the defensive

wound

prejudiced him.

(R.,

pp.73-74; Appellant’s brief, pp.23-30.) Instead, he alleged and argued in his opening brief only
that Dr.

Smock’s testimony

in

its

entirety prejudiced him.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.23-30.) But, as

With the testimony related to the superﬁcial abraded area, Conner challenged Dr. Smock’s
testimony related t0 the defensive
(R., p.224),

and Conner has

Smock’s testimony
objection,

c_f.

m,

wound only 0n the basis

failed

even

in its entirety if

73 F. App’x

at

that

it

exceeded the scope 0f his report

t0 allege that the district court should

have struck Dr.

Conner’s counsel had timely lodged the beyond-the-scope

709 (afﬁrming

district court’s

0f expert testimony that went outside the scope of his

exclusion of only those portions

report).

Furthermore, the record shows that Conner’s counsel’s failure to object t0 Dr. Smock’s

testimony about the defensive
least three reasons. First,

even

wound on

Otis’s

if Conner’s

ﬁnger could not have affected the verdict for

at

counsel had successfully excluded Dr. Smock’s direct-

18

examination testimony related t0 the defensive wound, the jury
defensive

wound

Smock gave

why one

during Dr. Smock’s cross—examination.

similar testimony about the defensive

Ls.3-8.)

With only one claw because
blow, and the reason

it

Speciﬁcally, Dr.

elicited

[marks]

is

ﬂ

insistence, Dr.

during cross—examination to explain

now be

because the other claw was blocked by the ﬁnger

if Dr.

would have heard about

Conner could not have objected

to testimony

844 P.2d 691, 695 (1992)

heard to denounce testimony that he roused”), and he did not allege

consistent With being hit

Second, even

testiﬁed that Otis could have been hit

State V. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 66,

that his counsel provided ineffective assistance

at

the

“could be Where Mr. Conner has his ﬁnger up there blocking the

we don’t see two

from Dr. Smock,

(“Appellant cannot

P.3d

At Conner’s counsel’s

wound

Smock

resulting in that laceration.” (TL, p.1605, Ls.3-8.)

was

would have heard about

of the wounds on Otis’s head did not leave a pattern consistent with the two claws of a

hammer. (TL, p.1605,

he

still

by probing Dr. Smock’s opinion

by the claws of a hammer

Smock had not testiﬁed

the defensive

that the injury

(R., pp.64-75).

about the defensive

wound from Bevel.

ﬂ

wound

at all, the

Johnson, 163 Idaho

at

jury

still

426-27, 414

248-49 (holding erroneous admission 0f testimony harmless because the same evidence

was properly admitted later in the trial); Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho

at

912, 71 P.3d at 1059 (holding

erroneous admission of report harmless because “[t]he report was a duplicate 0f testimony under
oath”); Leliefeld, 104 Idaho at 369-70,

evidence harmless because

Bevel testiﬁed

at length

it

about

659 P.2d

at

123-24 (holding erroneous admission of

“was largely duplicative of admissible and admitted evidence”).

how

“the three-quarter-inch cut

on the

tip

of the

index ﬁnger was consistent With a defensive wound.” (TL, p.1364, Ls.1 1-15;

—p.1273, L.15, p.1364, L.16 —p.1367, L12.)

19

ﬂ

[sic] Otis’s left

Tr., p.

1272, L. 1 8

Smock’s statements about the defensive wound were

Third, as the district court found, Dr.

relatively insigniﬁcant

part 0f Dr.

attack

When compared

Smock’s testimony was

to the rest

that the lacerations

from a hammer and inconsistent with

p.1580, L.5

— p.1582,

0f his testimony.6

0n Otis’s head were

cross—examination testimony and Bevel’s testimony and
state, there is

all

The signiﬁcant

consistent With an

falling off of a ladder. (TL, p.1572, L.6

L.19.) Because the challenged testimony

testimony supporting the

(R., p.229.)

was

duplicative of Dr.

made up only a

not a reasonable probability

— p.1578,

of the

trial

would have been

Smock’s

small part 0f Dr. Smock’s

that,

had Conner’s counsel

successfully objected t0 the admission of Dr. Smock’s testimony about the defensive

result

L.3,

wound, the

different.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

found that Conner failed

DATED this

Court afﬁrm the judgment entered

after the district court

t0 sufﬁciently allege Strickland prejudice.

12th day of December, 2019.

/s/

Jeff Nye

JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General

6

As with the rest ofDr. Smock’s testimony that the district court found excludable, the signiﬁcance
of Dr. Smock’s testimony about the defensive wound shrinks even further in light of the physical
evidence presented

at trial.

E

supra note

3.
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correct
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RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means of

have
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this 12th

iCourt File and Serve:
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